In this paper, a decentralized decision-making problem in stochastic environment is formulated as expected value multilevel programming, and chance-constrained multilevel programming according to different decision criteria. In order to solve the proposed stochastic multilevel programming models for finding the StackelbergNash equilibrium, genetic algorithm, neural network and stochastic simulation are integrated to produce a hybrid intelligent algorithm. Finally, two numerical examples are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the hybrid intelligent algorithm.
Introduction
In many decision processes, there are multiple decision makers arranged within a hierarchical administrative structure. These decision makers have divergent even conflict objectives, which intervenes in the decisions to be made. In order to solve such decentralized decision-making problems, multilevel programming was proposed by Bracken and McGill (6) (7) , and then was developed by many researchers. Interested readers may consult the review papers (33) (34) and the books (13) (20) . As an important and challenging topic, multilevel programming has received more and more attention, and applied to a wide variety of areas including economics (3) (8) , transportation (32) (35) , engineering (11) (29) , and so on. However, in these areas, real-world situations are often not deterministic. For instance, in economic systems, costs and demands are often subject to fluctuations and difficult to measure. In engineering, external conditions and measurement or manufacturing errors introduce uncertainty into the problems. These situations emphasize the need for models which are able to tackle uncertainty inherent in decision systems. However, there is little research in literature about decentralized decision making problem in uncertain decision systems. In (27) , Patriksson and Wynter discussed stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium, which includes stochastic bilevel programming as a special case. In (28) , Sakawa et al. dealt with multilevel programming problems with fuzzy parameters by a fuzzy interactive approach (19) (20) (30) . The fuzzy interactive approach is * Uncertainty Theory Laboratory, Department of Mathematical Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China * * Graduate School of Information, Production and Systems, Waseda University 3-1 Higashimagari-machi, Yahatanishi-ku, Kitakyushu-shi, Fukuoka 806-8585, Japan formulated by combined use of the fuzzy tolerance membership functions and multi-objective decision-making, which makes the original problem much more simplified, and much easier to solve. However, it is different from the traditional solution concept, Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, because it is assumed that decision makers at all levels are essentially cooperative. For the purpose of tackling uncertainty in decision systems, various stochastic programming models have been formulated in literature, among them we want to mention expected value model and chance-constrained programming model (10) . Motivated by the above mentioned works, in this paper, we propose two classes of stochastic multilevel programming models including expected value multi-level programming model (EVMLP) and chance-constrained multilevel programming (CCMLP), and design a hybrid intelligent algorithm for finding Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. Besides a new model CCMLP, the proposed EVMLP may have multiple followers, which distinguishes from stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium (27) . The purposes of this paper are twofolds, one is to establish an EVMLP and a CCMLP for a stochastic decentralized decision making problem with multiple followers. The other is to design efficient numerical algorithms for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. Toward that end, the following sections are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the formulation of EVMLP and CCMLP, then the concepts of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium are defined in this section. In Section 3.1, we first discuss how to approximate the uncertain functions involved in the proposed models. The motivation of the method is as follows, when searching for Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, we need many times of stochastic simulation to evaluate the uncertain functions. It is known that stochastic simulations are time-consuming processes. In order to speed up the solu-tion process, we desire to use relatively simple functions, neural networks (NNs), to replace these uncertain functions after they are well-trained by input-output data produced by stochastic simulations. After that, Section 3.2 discusses approaches on computing Nash equilibrium with respect to a given control vector. Based on the above discussion, Section 3.3 discusses how to solve the EVMLP and CCMLP for the Stackelber-Nash equilibrium. To do this, we embed the above trained NNs into a GA to produce a hybrid intelligent algorithm (HIA). At the end of the paper, two numerical examples are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
Stochastic Multilevel Programming
Consider a decentralized two-level decision system in which there is one leader and m followers. Assume that the leader and followers may have their own decision variables and objective functions, and the leader can only influence the reactions of followers through his own decision variables, while the followers have full authority to decide how to optimize their own objective functions in view of the decisions of the leader and other followers. Let x and y i be the control vectors of the leader and the i th followers, i = 1, 2, · · · , m, respectively. We also assume that the objective functions of the leader and i th followers are
respectively, where ξ is a vector representing the deterministic problem parameters.
In addition, let S be the feasible set of control vector x of the leader, defined by
where G is a vector-valued function of decision vector x and 0 is a vector with zero components. Then for each decision x chosen by the leader, the feasible set of control vector y i of the i th follower should be dependent on not only x but also y 1 , · · · , y i−1 , y i+1 , · · · , y m , and generally represented by the constraint
where g i are vector valued functions, i = 1, 2, · · · , m.
Multilevel programming offers a means of studying decentralized decision systems. Assume that the leader first chooses his control vector x ∈ S, and the followers determine their control array (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y m ) after that. Then a general bilevel programming has the following form,
However, if ξ is a stochastic vector, then the objective function F (x, y, ξ) and f i (x, y, ξ), i = 1, 2, · · · , m become stochastic. Moreover, the stochastic constraints G(x, ξ) ≤ 0 and g i (x, y, ξ) ≤ 0 do not define the feasible set of the optimization problem of the leader and the followers mathematically. In order to overcome this, we propose two types of stochastic programming models according to different decision criteria in the following subsections.
Expected Value Multilevel Programming
With the idea of optimizing the expected value of objective functions subject to some expected constraints, we propose the first type of stochastic multilevel programming, EVMLP.
Let the feasible set of control vector x of the leader be defined by the expected constraint
where G is a vector valued function and 0 is a zero vector. Then for each decision x chosen by the leader, the feasible set of control vector y i of the i th follower should be dependent on not only x but also y 1 , · · · , y i−1 , y i+1 , · · · , y m , and generally represented by the expected constraint
Assume that the leader first chooses his control vector x, and the followers determine their control array (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y m ) thereafter. In order to maximize the expected return of the leader, we have the following EVMLP,
A Nash equilibrium of followers is the feasible array
for any feasible (y *
A Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium to the EVMLP is the array (x * , y *
Chance-Constrained Multilevel Programming
Chance-constrained programming, which was initialized by Charnes and Cooper (10) , offers a powerful means for modelling stochastic decision systems. The essential idea of chance-constrained programming is to optimize the optimistic return with a given confidence level subject to some chance constraints. Inspired by this idea, we propose the second type of stochastic multilevel programming, CCMLP.
By chance constraint we mean that the stochastic constraints will hold at a confidence level provided as an appropriate safety margin by the decision-maker. Let the feasible set of control vector x of the leader be defined by the chance constraint
where G is a vector valued function, 0 is a zero vector, and β 0 is a confidence level at which it is desired that the stochastic constraints hold. Then for each decision x chosen by the leader, the feasible set of control vector y i of the i th follower should be dependent on not only x but also y 1 , · · · , y i−1 , y i+1 , · · · , y m , and generally represented by the chance constraints
where g i are vector valued functions, β i is a confidence level at which it is desired that the stochastic constraints hold, and i = 1, 2, · · · , m.
Because of the randomness of ξ, the objective function is also stochastic, which results that max x F (x, y, ξ) is meaningless. A natural idea is to provide a confidence level α 0 at which it is desired that F (x, y, ξ) ≥ F , where the confidence level α 0 is provided as an appropriate safety margin by the leader. Then the objective of the leader is to maximize F with a chance constraint as follows,
where F is referred to as the α 0 -optimistic return of F (x, y, ξ). Then for each decision x chosen by the leader, the objective of the i th follower is to maximize the α i -optimistic return f i with a chance constraint as follows,
where α i is a confidence level provided as an appropriate safety margin by the i th follower. Assume that the leader first chooses his control vector x, and the followers determine their control array (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y m ) thereafter. In order to maximize the α 0 -optimistic return of the leader, we have the following CCMLP,
· · · · (13)
A Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium to the CCMLP is the array (
for any feasible x and the Nash equilibrium
with respect to x.
A Hybrid Intelligent Algorithm
It is known that the multilevel programming, even in the simplest case, is NP-hard (4) . Thus, successful implementations of multilevel models rely largely on the development of efficient algorithms. In the past two decades, many intriguing numerical algorithms have been developed. These algorithms may fall into four categories:
• vertex enumeration approach, which aims to seek a comprising vertex by simplex algorithm based on adjusting the control variables (9) (5) .
• transformation approach, which transforms the lower level problems into constraints for the higher level by use of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
or penalty functions (12) (31) .
• heuristics like decent approach (18) (31) , and branch and bound method (2) (16) .
• intelligent algorithms like genetic algorithm (21) (29) , and simulated annealing (36) , which are especially suited for solving NP-hard problems like the multilevel programming problems. As an extension of multilevel/stochastic programming, stochastic multilevel programming will further complicate ordinary multilevel programming. Correspondingly, resolution strategies will in many cases require some approximate methods for solving stochastic multilevel programming models. In the following subsections, we take the EVMLP as an example to discuss the numerical solution methods.
Uncertain Function Approximation
By uncertain functions we mean the functions with uncertain parameters. The uncertain functions in stochastic multilevel programming (6) and (13) may fall into three types. Due to the complexity, we design stochastic simulations for computing the uncertain functions.
The first type of uncertain function is
In order to compute it, we design a stochastic simulation as follows,
Step 1. Set U 1 = 0
Step 2. Generate ω from Ω according to the probability measure Pr.
Step 3. Compute the function value F (x, y, ξ(ω)) and denote it by c.
Step 5. Repeat the second to fourth steps for M times, where M is a sufficiently large number.
The second type of uncertain function is
A procedure of stochastic simulation is given as follows,
Step 1. Generate ω 1 , ω 2 , · · · , ω M from Ω according to the probability measure Pr, where M is a sufficiently large number.
Step 2. For each ω k , compute the function value F (x, y, ξ(ω k )) and denote it by c k .
Step 3. Set M as the integer part of (1 − α)M .
Step 4. Return the M -th least element in
The third type of uncertain function is
We also design a stochastic simulation as follows,
Step 3. Compute the function value F (x, y, ξ(ω))
and denote it by c. Step 4. If c < F , set M → M + 1.
So far, we can see that stochastic simulations are able to compute the above uncertain functions. However, stochastic simulation is a time-consuming process. In order to speed up the solution process, we train feedforward NNs to approximate uncertain functions because NNs have the high speed of operation after they are trained.
A feedforward NN is essentially a nonlinear mapping from the input space to the output space. Assume that the mapping is characterized by U (x, y, w) where w denotes the network weights. A training process on a set of input-output data (
, · · · , N is to find the best weight vector that minimizes the following error function
Sum Squared Error(w)
where x (k) and y (k) are control vectors of the leader and followers, respectively, z (k) are the corresponding function values that are calculated by stochastic simulations, and k (= 1, 2, · · · , M) is the index. In this paper, the popular backpropagation algorithm is employed as the learning algorithm, and the average error Average Error(w)
is also used to demonstrate the accuracy of the trained NNs. For detailed discussion on uncertain function approximation, the reader may consult Chapter 3 in the book (22) by Liu.
Computing Nash Equilibrium
Define symbols 
· · · · (22)
In order to search for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium of an EVMLP, we should first compute the Nash equilibrium with respect to any decision revealed by the leader. It is clear that the Nash equilibrium of the m followers will be the solution (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y m ) of the system of equations
In other words, we should find a fixed point of the vector-valued function (r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r m ). This task may be achieved by solving the following minimization problem,
· · · (24)
If the optimal solution (y * In a numerical solution process, if an array (y *
where ε is a small positive number, then we can regard (y * 1 , y * 2 , · · · , y * m ) as the Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, we may suppose that there is no Nash equilibrium for the given control vector x. Now let us turn attention to the optimization problem (24) . Since the objective function
involves m mappings r i (y −i ), i = 1, 2, · · · , m, the objective function may be very complex. So we have to employ some algorithm, which does not require specific mathematical analysis, but can provide good solutions of complex optimization problems. Herein, we use genetic algorithm to search for the Nash equilibrium. For detailed exposition of GAs, interested readers may consult books (14) (15) (17) . For a given control vector x, a GA procedure for the Nash equilibrium of the optimization problem (23) is given as follows.
Step 0. Input a feasible control vector x.
Step 1. Generate pop size chromosomes y (j) , j = 1, 2, · · · , pop size at random from the feasible set. Step 3. Compute the fitness of each chromosome according to the objective values.
Step 4. Select the chromosomes by spinning the roulette wheel.
Step 5. Update the chromosomes by crossover and mutation operations. Step 6. Repeat Steps 2-5 until the best chromosome satisfies inequality (26).
Step 7. Return the Nash equilibrium y(x) = (y 1 (x), y 2 (x), · · · , y m (x)).
Hybrid Intelligent Algorithm
For any feasible control vector x revealed by the leader, denote the Nash equilibrium with respect to x by (y 1 (x), · · · , y m (x)), then the EVMLP (6) can be simplified as follows,
The objective function E [F (x, y 1 (x), · · · , y m (x), ξ)] involves not only uncertain parameters, but also a complex mapping x → (y 1 (x), y 2 (x), · · · , y m (x)), which makes the optimization problem difficult to solve. Therefore, GA is a good candidate for solving such a model for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, although it is a relatively slow way. Now we integrate stochastic simulations, NNs, and GA to produce an HIA for solving general EVMLP. In the HIA, input-output data of uncertain functions are first generated by stochastic simulation. Then NNs are trained on these sample sets to approximate uncertain functions. After that, the trained NNs are embedded into a GA so as to search for Stakelberg-Nash equilibrium efficiently. The procedure of the HIA is given as follows.
Step 1. Generate input-output data of uncertain functions.
Step 2. Train NNs by backpropagation algorithm.
Step 3. Initialize pop size chromosomes x (i) , i = 1, 2, · · · , pop size randomly.
Step 4. Compute the Nash equilibrium with respect to each chromosome x (i) , and then the objective values E F (
Step 5. Compute the fitness of each chromosome according to the objective values.
Step 6. Select the chromosomes by spinning the roulette wheel.
Step 7. Update the chromosomes by crossover and mutation operations.
Step 8. Repeat Steps 4-7 for a given number of cycles.
Step 9. Return the best chromosome as the optimal solution.
Numerical Examples
The computer code for the HIA has been written in C language. In order to illustrate its effectiveness, we provide two numerical examples performed on a personal computer. Example 1. We consider a stochastic decentralized decision making problem in which there is one leader and three followers. Assume the control vector is x = (x 1 , x 2 ), and the control vectors of the three followers are y i = (y i1 , y i2 ), i = 1, 2, 3. Its EVMLP is given as follows,
2 subject to:
where by stochastic simulation. Then we train four NNs to approximate the uncertain functions U i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Table 1 gives the number of input-output data, input, hidden, and output neurons of the four NNs. In order to further illustrate the accuracy of the trained NNs, three types of samples are used for testing. The first is to select 1000 input-output data from the train set randomly. The second is to sample 1000 new input-output data from the predetermined domain. Another 1000 input-output data is generated by sampling 1000 feasible control vector, computing out their corresponding Nash equilibriums, and then the function values. From the comparison results of the average errors of the three type of samples in Table 2 , we can see that the maximum average error is less than 2.8%. So the NNs are good approximations of the four uncertain functions.
In the GA procedures for the both the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, there are some parameters such as the population size (pop size), the probability of crossover (P c ), the probability of mutation (P m ). In Table 3 , we compare solutions when different parameters are taken with the same generations as a stopping rule. It appears that all the optimal solution and the optimum differ little from each other. In order to account for it, we present a parameter, called percent error, i.e. (actual value -optimal value)/ optimal value × 100%, where the optimal value is the minimal one of all the six maximum obtained above. The last column named by "error" in Table 3 is just this parameter. It follows from Table 2 that the percent error does not exceed 0.2% when different parameters are selected, which implies that the HIA is robust to the parameter settings and effective to solve model (6) .
According to the computing result in Table 3 , we can see that x 1 is very close to 0, and that x 2 is very close to 10. A direct computation of the control vector (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 10) shows that the optimal return of the leader is 652.77, the Nash equilibrium of the followers is and the optimal return of the three followers are 9.9876, 5.5016, and 4.1140, respectively. Example 2. Now we reconsider the above stochastic decentralized decision making problem. Suppose the leader and followers want to optimize their optimistic return with a given confidence level subject to some chance constraints, then the stochastic decentralized decision making problem can be formulated as the following CCMLP.
where
subject to: by stochastic simulation. Then we train four NNs to approximate the uncertain functions U i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Table 4 gives the number of input-output data, input, hidden, and output neurons of the four NNs. Table 5 gives the comparison results of the average errors of the three type of samples, which indicates that the NNs are good approximations of the four uncertain functions. In Table 6 , we compare solutions when different parameters are taken with the same generations as a stopping rule. The result implies that the HIA is robust to the parameter settings and effective to solve model (13) . Now we use the fourth result (0, 9.9999) in Table 6 as the optimal control vector with the optimal return 570. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, two classes of stochastic multilevel programming models were proposed for dealing with decentralized decision making problem in stochastic environment. In order to solve them for the StackelbergNash equilibrium, an HIA was designed by integrating stochastic simulation, NN, and GA. Two numerical examples showed that the HIA is robust and effective.
